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ABSTRACT
In a market with symmetric information about fundamentals, can information-based trade still arise?
Consider bond and FX markets, where private information about nominal cash flows is generally
absent, but participants are convinced that superior information exists. We analyze a class of
asymmetric information – inventory information – that is unrelated to fundamentals, but still
forecasts future price (by forecasting future discount factors). Empirical work based on the analysis
shows that inventory information in FX does indeed forecast discount factors, and does so over both
short and long horizons. The immediate price impact of shocks to inventory information is large,
roughly 50 percent of that from public information shocks (the latter being the whole story under
symmetric information). Within about 30 minutes the transitory effect dies out, and prices reflect
a permanent effect from inventory information that ranges between 15 and 30 percent of that from
public information.
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In a market with symmetric information about fundamentals, can information-based trade still 
arise? The question is central to our understanding of some important markets, e.g., government 
bond and FX markets, where the premise of symmetric information about fundamentals is 
natural, yet participants are convinced that superior information exists (see, e.g., Cheung and 
Wong 2000, Ciccotello and Hatheway, 2000, Massa and Simonov 2003, Green 2002). To resolve 
the puzzle we address a class of information that we call inventory information. Inventory 
information is orthogonal to fundamentals (that is, orthogonal to cash flows from holding the 
asset, e.g., future coupons and principal in the case of a bond and future interest differentials in 
the case of FX). At the same time, inventory information has the power to forecast future price. It 
does so by forecasting future discount factors (over both short and long horizons).
1 Inventory 
information is also asymmetric: initially it manifests in marketmaker positions, which are 
privately observed, and is only subsequently impounded in price. These two features—ability to 
forecast price and private observation—provide the basis for information-based trade.  
Beyond clarifying this information-based trade, our analysis shows that price effects from 
non-fundamental trades are of three distinct types. The first is idiosyncratic to individual 
marketmaker prices and is transitory—the so-called inventory effects from microstructure theory. 
The second type is common to all marketmaker prices (intraday risk premia) and is also 
transitory. In traditional models with a single marketmaker, the first and second of these are 
effectively the same. The third type of price effect from non-fundamental trade is common to all 
marketmaker prices and is permanent. This third price effect persists even after marketmaker 
inventories are fully shared economy-wide (e.g., permanent portfolio effects across assets that are 
imperfect substitutes; see, e.g., Scholes 1972 and Branson and Henderson 1985). Traditional 
models of securities trading do not address this third effect: in most models, inventory risk is 
assumed diversifiable at the economy-wide level.
2 Our empirical methodology is designed to 
accommodate this third, permanent effect. 
Our empirical strategy for isolating price effects from inventory information is based on 
the FX market, a market where superior information about future cash flows is generally absent. 
                                                      
1 The asset pricing literature addresses permanent price effects from changing discount factors, but without the 
information-based trading that is our focus here. For example, Duffie and Constantinides (1996) show that permanent 
shocks to endowments cannot be insured against and therefore affect prices. That permanent shocks to endowments are 
relevant empirically is shown by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2003). 
2 This third type of effect also arises in the models of Lyons (1997) and Saar (1999) and is addressed empirically in 
equity markets by Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002).   2
This feature of FX is not shared by the equity market. For equities, empirical findings that order 
flow induces permanent price changes is generally interpreted as evidence that initiating 
counterparties have more information about future cash flows than is impounded in price. This 
interpretation is sensible because (i) many factors affecting equity cash flows—e.g., earnings—
are well understood, and (ii) it is credible that some traders have superior information about these 
factors. Neither condition applies to the FX market. The factors affecting cash flows to holding 
major currencies are, empirically, unknown: movements in spot rates are almost completely 
disconnected from the macroeconomic fundamentals that determine these cash flows (Meese and 
Rogoff 1983, Frankel and Rose 1995).
3 Moreover, even in the few cases where macro news 
events do have significant (but small) effects on spot rates (Andersen et al. 2003), there is no 
evidence that individuals have access to information prior to scheduled public release. In fact, the 
only instance where asymmetric information about future cash flows might become an issue in 
FX is when a central bank places an intervention trade. However, our sample period contains no 
interventions, so even this potential source of trade-related cash-flow information is not present. 
(In any event, most central bank intervention trades are “sterilized” as a matter of course, 
meaning that their effects on macroeconomic variables like interest rates and money supplies are 
neutralized.) In sum, the empirical case that FX trades do not contain information about cash 
flows is a strong one.  
We find that inventory information has both transitory and permanent price effects. The 
immediate price impact from shocks to inventory information is about 50 percent of that from 
shocks to public information (the latter being the whole story under symmetric information). 
After 30 minutes the transitory effect of shocks to inventory information dies out, and prices 
reflect a permanent effect that ranges between 15 and 30 percent of that from public information 
(depending on model variations). These effects are precisely estimated and economically 
significant. They imply that a $1 billion positive shock to interdealer order flow permanently 
increases the deutschemark price of a dollar by 0.25 to 0.45 of a pfennig. Transitory price effects 
are also significant: of the total variance of price changes from inventory information, transitory 
effects account for between 43 and 89 percent at horizons from 30 minutes to two hours.
4 
One implication of our analysis is that past empirical work finding that order flow has 
permanent effects on price may have misinterpreted this as evidence of private information about 
                                                      
3 As Meese (1990) put it in his survey, “the proportion of (monthly or quarterly) exchange rate changes that current 
models can explain is essentially zero”. This is echoed in the later survey by Frankel and Rose (1995): “To repeat a 
central fact of life, there is remarkably little evidence that macroeconomic variables have consistent strong effects on 
floating exchange rates”. The consensus remains true today. 
4 Transitory inventory effects on price are documented in Lyons (1995), Hansch et al. (1998), Madhavan and Sofianos 
(1999), and Reiss and Werner (1999).  3
fundamentals, when in reality some permanent effects reflect dispersed information about 
discount rates (for example, analysis using the methodology of Hasbrouck 1991).
5 Our empirical 
results are a first step in addressing these issues more fully.   
From a modeling perspective, two main features distinguish our paper from earlier work. 
The first is the question we address, which is not posed clearly elsewhere in the literature, to our 
knowledge (whether information-based trade can still arise in a market with symmetric 
information about fundamentals). That the question warrants posing is evidenced by recent 
analysis of bond markets (e.g., Massa and Simonov 2003 and Green 2002) that uses the analysis 
below as its driving theoretical motivation. We extend the Lyons (1997) model to address the 
forecasting of discount factors (not an issue addressed in that paper). Our analysis demonstrates 
that inventory information is not special, but relies instead on two rather generally present 
ingredients: less than perfect transparency and risk aversion. Less than perfect transparency 
insures that inventory information is not instantly symmetrized. Risk aversion insures that 
inventory information is relevant to prices. The combination allows for information-based trading 
even when fundamental information is symmetric.  
The second feature that distinguishes our modeling is our information structure. There is 
but a single source of information-based trade in the model: marketmakers’ private knowledge of 
their own inventories, which are, by construction, orthogonal to fundamentals. This distinguishes 
our work from all three of the leading theoretical approaches to securities trading: the rational 
expectations approach, the microstructure information approach, and the microstructure inventory 
approach. Our model differs from rational expectations models (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 
1981 and Hellwig 1980) in that if one were to remove private cash-flow information from those 
models, aggregate endowment shocks would be fully revealed, leaving no scope for trading based 
on superior endowment information.
6 This same property is true of the recent generation of 
microstructure information models (e.g., Gennotte and Leland 1990, Roell 1990, Fishman and 
Longstaff 1992, Kumar and Seppi 1992, Madrigal 1996, and Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan 
1999). Though designed to address quite different issues (e.g., crashes, dual trading, and 
                                                      
5 Both the permanent and transitory price impacts from dispersed, non-fundamental information would show up (and be 
interpreted) as fundamental information under structural empirical approaches like that of Madhavan and Smidt (1991). 
The reason is straightforward in the case of permanent price impacts. For transitory price impacts, which in our model 
are a function of dealer inventories on average, so long as individual dealer inventories do not correlated perfectly with 
the average, then including a dealer’s own inventory in the regression will not fully account for the price effect.  
6 Our analysis is not the first to use endowment-type information as conditioning information (early examples include 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1981, Hellwig 1980, and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam 1992). The difference, as noted, is 
whether this constitutes superior information for speculative trade when fundamental information is symmetric (and it 
does not in all these other models). A more recent rational expectations analysis by Kraus and Smith (1989) shows 
that—for certain equilibria—prices can move between periods even though it is common knowledge that no new 
fundamental information has arrived. They do not address the implications of private non-fundamental information.  4
transparency), all these models include private information about fundamentals as an essential 
ingredient: in each, superior information about some feature of the trading environment (such as 
risky-asset endowments or liquidity-motivated demand) allows one to forecast how price is 
misinterpreting cash flows. If these models excluded private information about cash flows, then 
knowledge of the trading environment that is unrelated to fundamentals would not be useful in 
forecasting price. (These models assume risk neutrality, so that direct effects on price from non-
fundamental information cannot arise.) Our model departs from the microstructure inventory 
approach in that those models generally do not allow, or do not address, how agents would 
exploit their evolving inventory information via speculative position-taking (e.g., Biais 1993, 
Vayanos 1999, Viswanathan and Wang 2000).
7  
  The rest of the paper is in five sections. Section I presents a trading model designed to 
isolate inventory information. Sections II and III describe the model’s equilibrium and present 
results on how inventory information motivates speculative trade. Section IV presents our 
empirical analysis. Section V concludes.  
 
I.  A Model of Interdealer Trading 
  Our multiple-dealer model corresponds most closely to trading in the largest multiple-
dealer market—the market for spot foreign exchange (FX).
8 This market is an interesting target 
because, as noted, superior information about fundamentals—e.g., future interest differentials—is 
generally absent, despite market participants being convinced that superior information exists 
(see, e.g., Cheung and Wong 2000) and despite empirical findings consistent with information 
asymmetries.
9  
We consider an infinitely lived, discrete-time trading environment with three agent types: 
n dealers (who behave strategically), a continuum of liquidity-demanding customers, and a 
continuum of liquidity-supplying customers. All agents maximize the following utility function: 












=− − ∑  
where ct is the agent’s consumption in period t, γ  is the coefficient of (absolute) risk aversion, and 
                                                      
7 Though there is no information asymmetry across dealers in Vayanos (1998), that model does include a large non-
dealer participant who trades strategically based on his endowment (which is cash flow unrelated). There is now a large 
literature on interdealer trade. On the theory side, see for example Ho and Stoll (1983), Vogler (1997), and Werner 
(1997). 
8 The model should not be viewed as applying to this market only, however. Most bond markets and many equity 
markets share a similar multiple-dealer structure.  
9 Though there is strong evidence that information asymmetries exist, these empirical results are not specific regarding 
their nature. See, e.g., Lyons (1995), Yao (1998), Ito et al. (1998), Covrig and Melvin (2002), Payne (1999), Evans 
(2002), and Evans and Lyons (2002).  5
δ   is the rate of time preference (the latter two parameters assumed equal for all agents). We 
assume that δ  (1+r) = 1, where r is the net return on the riskless asset (this assumption greatly 
simplifies the algebra in the dynamic programming problem). 
Each day includes four trading rounds (see Figure 1). The day opens with a round of 
trading between dealers and liquidity-demanding customers, which is followed with a round of 
interdealer trading. After the first round of interdealer trading, order flow information is observed 
and there is a second round of interdealer trading. After the two interdealer trading rounds there is 
a final round of customer-dealer trade (this time with liquidity-supplying customers) to share risk 
with the public more broadly. Indeed, the dealers will end each day with no net risky position, 
leading them to maximize expected utility over intraday returns. Daily closing prices change due 
to the permanent inventory shifts of the liquidity-demanding customers on the one hand and to 
the willingness of the liquidity-supplying customers to absorb them on the other. 
  A key feature of the model is that trading within a round occurs simultaneously. This 
simultaneous-trade approach is in the spirit of simultaneous-move games (cf, sequential-move 
games). Simultaneous trading has the effect of constraining dealers’ conditioning information: 
within any round dealers cannot condition on that round’s realization of others’ trades. We 
consider this level of conditioning information more realistic than that implicit in rational-
expectations models (see Hellwig 1982 for another method of relaxing the strong assumption 
about conditioning information in rational-expectations models). Realism aside, though, the 
essential implication is that constraining conditioning information in this way allows dealers to 
trade on inventory information before it is reflected in price. Thus, unlike traditional trading 
models, in our model dealers can exploit inventory information in their trading.
10         
There are two assets, one riskless and one risky. The daily interest rate (net) on the 
riskless asset is r.
11 The cash flow in period t, Rt, on the risky asset is realized prior to the last 
round of trading between the public and the dealers, where Rt is normally distributed about 0 with 
known variance 
2
R σ : 
(2)  ()
2 ~0 , tR RNσ  
 
The cash flows on the risky asset are serially uncorrelated and the risky asset is in zero supply 
                                                      
10 The lack of an opportunity to exploit inventory information in traditional microstructure models may help explain 
why that literature has paid so little attention to it for so long. Less than complete transparency is another means of 
allowing dealers to trade on inventory information before it is impounded in price. 
11 We assume that interest accrues between trading rounds 3 and 4. This does not affect any of our results and is 
assumed for simplicity of exposition.   6
initially.




Customers trade with dealers 
Round 2 
Dealers quote 
Dealers trade with dealers 
Interdealer order flow is observed 
Round 3 
Dealers quote 
Dealers trade with dealers 
The cash flow Rt is realized 
Round 4 
Dealers quote 




  The first event in all rounds is dealer quoting. Let Pijt denote the quote of dealer i in round 
j on day t. The rules governing dealer quotes are: 
 
(R1)  Quoting is simultaneous, independent, and required  
(R2)  Quotes are observable and available to all participants 
(R3)  Each quote is a single price at which the dealer agrees buy and sell any amount
13 
 
Rule 1 places this model in the simultaneous-trade approach to dealer markets (c.f., the 
sequential trade approach of Glosten and Milgrom 1985). Though the sequential-trade approach 
is popular for single-dealer modeling, it becomes unwieldy in multiple-dealer settings. (As an 
empirical matter, simultaneous moves in the foreign exchange and bond markets occur, for 
example, via electronic dealing systems that allow simultaneous quotes and simultaneous trades.) 
The key implication of rule R1 is that the quote of dealer i in a given round j cannot be 
conditioned on the round-j quotes of other dealers. That quotes are required prevents a dealer 
from exiting the game at times of informational disadvantage; it squares with the fact that in 
actual multiple-dealer markets, refusing to quote violates an implicit contract of reciprocal 
immediacy and can be punished (e.g., by reciprocating with refusals). 
                                                      
12 In the introduction we noted that in order to isolate (and clarify) the role of non-fundamental information we specify 
our model such that cash flow expectations never change. Constant cash flow expectations is a product of both the 
simple specification of cash flows in equation (2) and the lack of any variable that can forecast those cash flows. 
Adding dynamics to equation (2) would not change the essential economics of our analysis. 
13 In the FX market, this assumption of a single price is much less extreme than in other markets: bid-ask spreads are 
typically only 1-2 basis points for $10 million trades. In any event, our basic results go through in a variation of the 
model in which each interdealer quote is a price schedule, but is observable and available to only one other dealer. 
Though this variation is quite near to reality, it is a good deal more cumbersome. These results are available from the 
authors on request.   7
Rule R2 defines the first of the model’s three dimensions of transparency: quotes are 
fully transparent, which includes quotes for customer trades and for interdealer trades. Regarding 
rule R3, note that it would be straightforward to add a commission or size-dependent spread for 
customer trades in order to model the entry decision and endogenize the number of participating 
dealers. Given the focus of this paper, modeling the entry decision is a distraction so we abstract 
from it here.   
Customer Trades 
Market orders from liquidity-demanding (LD) customers arrive in round one and are 
independent of the daily cash flow Rt. They are cleared at the receiving dealer’s round-one quote 
Pi1t. Each customer trade is assigned—or preferenced—to a single dealer (possibly due to 
unmodeled bilateral relationships). The total (net) customer order received by a particular dealer 
is distributed normally around 0, with known variance 
2
x σ :  
(3)  ()
2 ~0 , it x xNσ  
We use the convention that xit is positive for net customer purchases and negative for net sales. 
Though the assumptions of preferencing and exogeneity of xit appear strong at this stage, we show 
below that equilibrium dealer quotes in round one are all the same, and conditional on public 
information this price is also unbiased, so LD customers are not being exploited at these prices. 
LD customer trades embody the second of the model’s three dimensions of transparency: 
xit  is not observed by other dealers. This is important—these customer trades are the private non-
fundamental information in the model. In foreign exchange, dealers have no direct information 
about other banks’ customer trades.
14 
Interdealer Trading  
  The model’s four-round structure is designed to highlight the two rounds of interdealer 
trading that occur in the middle of each day (as this is where price discovery occurs). Let Tijt 
denote the net outgoing interdealer order placed by dealer i in round j (j=2,3); let T
′
ijt denote the 
net incoming interdealer order received by dealer i in round j, placed by other dealers. The rules 
governing interdealer trading for both rounds are as follows: 
 
(R4)  Trading is simultaneous and independent  
(R5)  Trading with multiple partners is feasible 
(R6)  Trades are divided equally among dealers with the same quote (if any transaction is 
desired at this quote).  
                                                                                                                                                              
  
14 Our specification accords well with practitioner survey responses that “better information” and “large customer base” 
are the two main sources of competitive advantage for large players in the FX market (Cheung and Wong 2000).   8
Rule R4 generates an interesting role for T
′
ijt in the model: because interdealer trading is 




ijt is an unavoidable disturbance 
to dealer i’s position in round j that must be carried into the following round. The restriction in 
rule R6—that trades are split equally if quotes are common—can be relaxed. For example, 
allowing a split into k<n equal fractions is straightforward as long as k is known. (An unknown m 
generates a non-normal position disturbance.) This relaxation would provide less risk sharing, but 
would not affect the path of price, nor would it affect dealers’ incentive to speculate on the basis 
of private non-fundamental information (as we will see below). 
  Consider now the determination of dealer i’s outgoing interdealer orders in rounds 2 and 
3 of each day. We sign all orders according to the party initiating the trade. Thus, Tijt is positive 
for dealer i purchases, and T
′
ijt is positive for purchases by other dealers from dealer i. 
Consequently, a positive xit or T
′
ijt corresponds to a dealer i sale. Letting Dijt denote dealer i’s 
speculative demand, we have by definition: 
(4)     22 2 2 [| ] ′ =+ + Ω it it i t it it TDx E T  
(5)     33 22 2 2 3 3 () ( [ | ] ) [ | ] ′′ ′ =−+ − Ω + Ω it it it it it it it it TD D T E T E T  
where Ω i2t and Ω i3t denote dealer i’s information sets at the time of trading in round two and 
three, respectively. Equation (4) clarifies that dealer orders include both a speculative component 
Di2t and two inventory control components xit and E[T
′
i2t|Ω i2t]. Di2t, the speculative demand, is 
purely information driven: dealers use information from their private observation of customer 
demand xit to forecast subsequent price changes. The first inventory control component, xit, must 
be fully offset in interdealer trading to establish the desired position Di2t. The second inventory 
control component  22 [| ] ′ Ω it it ET  reflects that dealers also do their best to hedge against the 
incoming dealer order T
′
i2t (the realization of which they cannot know ex-ante due to 
simultaneous trading). In round three, establishing the speculative demand Di3t implies that the 
trade rule for Ti3t has three components. It must account for the change in speculative  demand 
(Di3t ￿Di2t) plus two inventory control components, the first reflecting the unexpected component 
of the realized incoming round-two order and the second reflecting the hedge of the round-three 
incoming order (the plus sign preceding T
′
i2t in equation 5 reflects that T
′
i2t > 0 is a dealer i sale in 
round two).  
Interdealer Order Flow  
  The last event in round two defines the third of the model’s three dimensions of 
transparency – that applying to interdealer trades. At the close of round two all dealers observe 






t i t T Z
1
2 . 
This sum over Ti2t is net interdealer demand – the difference in buy and sell orders. In bond and 
FX markets, Zt is the information on interdealer order-flow provided by interdealer brokers (see 
Lyons 2001 for details). Actual dealers in these markets describe this is an essential source of 
real-time information.  
Note that we specify this as a noiseless measure, which maximizes the transparency 
difference across trade types (customer-dealer with zero transparency and interdealer with 
complete transparency). As noted above, FX trades between customers and dealers do indeed 
have zero transparency. It is not the case, however, that the actual transparency of interdealer 
trades is complete. Nevertheless, it will be clear from our results that adding noise to equation (6) 
has no qualitative impact, so we stick to this simpler specification.  
Trading with the Public  
  Liquidity-supplying (LS) customer trades in round four are non-stochastic: these agents 
are induced to trade conditional on past price movements and other information available to them. 
These trades are the means by which dealers share overnight risk with the non-dealer public. 
Round four begins with each dealer quoting (simultaneously and independently) a scalar price Pi4t 
at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount. These quotes are observable and available to all 
LS customers.  
  The mass of public investors on the interval [0,m] is large relative to the n dealers. This 
implies that the dealers’ capacity for bearing overnight risk is  small relative to the public’s 
capacity (despite dealers and public investors having the same coefficient of risk aversion). 
Nevertheless, the public is assumed to have finite risk-bearing capacity.  Under these assumptions, 
dealers will optimally set prices such that the public willingly absorbs dealer inventory 
imbalances, and each dealer ends the day with no net position.
15  These round-four prices are 
conditioned on the interdealer order flow Zt. The interdealer order flow informs dealers of the 
total size of the position that the public needs to absorb to bring the dealers back to a position of 
zero.  
Dealer Objectives and Information Sets 
  Each dealer determines quotes and speculative demand by maximizing the utility 
function shown in equation (1). Because dealers hold no overnight positions, and because dealers 
                                                      
15 Technically, these assumptions would drive dealers’ overnight demand arbitrarily close to zero, but not to zero, since 
dealers’ aggregate mass is not zero. That we treat their overnight demand as exactly zero must therefore be considered 
an assumption.  10
face a daily stochastic environment that is time invariant, solution to the corresponding one-
period problem is intertemporally optimal. Letting Wi4t denote the end-of-day t wealth of dealer i, 
we can write this problem as:  
 
(7)  []
24 2 3 13
41
{}
ˆ exp( | )
,,,, , it it it it it it
it it
PPPPD D
MAX E W γ −− Ω
 
s.t. 
    
'' '' ' ' '
4 0 12 23 32 23 3 22334 () ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) it it i t it it it it it it it it it i t it it it it it t W W x P TP TP TP TP r x T T T T P R =+ + + − − + + − − + − ++
 
where  ˆ γ  is the intertemporal risk aversion coefficient (i.e., that which applies to wealth, as 
opposed to the γ  in equation 1 that applies to periodic consumption).
16 Pijt is dealer i’s round-j 
quote, a ′  denotes a quote or trade received by dealer i. The first term in brackets in the constraint 
reflects the aggregate position in the risk free asset at the time of the net cash flow on that asset 
(that cash flow being r). The final term in brackets reflects the round-four liquidation of any 
remaining risky-asset position. The conditioning information Ω ijt at each decision node is 
summarized in Appendix A.  
Market Clearing 
Since dealers end the day without any net position, market clearing requires that the LS 
customers’ demand dt absorbs all the orders of the customers in the first round. Therefore,  
(8)  0 = + t t x d  
where we have defined xt =Σ ixit as the aggregate LD customer flow in round one.  
To solve the model, we first conjecture the pricing and trading strategies for dealers and 
public investors and then show that the proposed equilibrium is consistent with dealers’ and 
public investors’ maximizing behavior.  (Detailed proofs are provided in Appendix A.) Let ht-1 
denote the aggregate holdings of the LS customers at the end of day t-1. Remember that, by 
assumption, dealers hold zero inventory at the end of each trading day. Thus we must have: 
(9)  ht = ht-1 + dt 
The LS customers trade dynamically in the fourth round of each day to maximize their expected 
utility (equation 1). 
                                                      
16 The appendix shows that 
1 ˆ (1 ) rr γγ
− =+ . Intuitively, consumption effects from changes in wealth are smoothed 
across a perpetuity of consumption, which is why  ˆ γγ < . In continuous time,  ˆ r γγ = .  11
II.  Equilibrium 
  The equilibrium concept we use is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Under 
PBE, Bayes rule is used to update beliefs and strategies are sequentially rational given those 
beliefs. 
Solving for the symmetric PBE, first we consider properties of optimal quoting strategies. 
Consider first the sequence of end-of-day prices:  
 
PROPOSITION 1:  There exists an equilibrium in which end-of-day price is a linear function of 
the aggregate LS customer holdings:  
  t t ah P − = 4  
 
Proofs are in the appendix. The intuition is the following: Because the aggregate speculative 
demand of LS customers is not perfectly elastic, and given the unchanging stream of expected 
risky-asset cash flows (Rt), LS customers will only hold a larger position (higher ht) if they are 
induced to do so with a lower price, i.e., with a higher expected return. 
  This first proposition is crucial for understanding how inventory information (i.e., non-
fundamental information that is first impounded in dealer inventories) can be useful for 
forecasting permanent price components. LS customers will forever need a lower price to induce 
them to hold larger positions ht indefinitely (and these positions do need to be held indefinitely 
because LD customer flows are not mean reverting). Information about increments to ht is 
impounded in dealer inventories and revealed to the market by via interdealer trading.    
  Consider now the three price quotes within each trading day. The following proposition 
addresses quotes in rounds one and two:  
 
PROPOSITION 2:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric PBE only if the round-one 
and round-two quotes are common across dealers and both are unbiased 
predictors of the following round’s price conditional on public information:  
  ] | [ 1 2 1 t t t P E P Ω =  
  ] | [ 2 3 2 t t t P E P Ω =  
 
To understand why the quote P1t to customers in round-one is an unbiased predictor of the 
interdealer quote P2t in round two, let us suppose it is not, which we will see is inconsistent with  12
market clearing.
17 Market clearing in round one requires a price at which expected dealer 
demands and expected customer demands sum to zero. Now, if the price change expected from 
round one to round two is not zero (i.e., if P1t is a biased predictor of P2t), then dealers’ aggregate 
demand in round one would not be zero. But because customer demand xt is an exogenous, mean-
zero variable, before its realization the expectation of xt is necessarily zero. Therefore, any biased 
price cannot be an equilibrium price. The logic for understanding why the price in round two 
needs to be an unbiased predictor of the round-three price is the same: in that case, unbiasedness 
is necessary for market clearing in interdealer trading.  
  An implication of common quotes is that in round two each dealer receives a 1/n share of 
the orders submitted by other dealers (per trading rule R6). This order corresponds to the position 
disturbance T
′
i2t in the dealer’s problem in Eq. (7). The next proposition addresses round-three 
quotes: 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  A quoting strategy is consistent with symmetric PBE only if the common 
round-three quote is:  
  t t t t Z r P E P λ + Ω + = ] | ) 1 /( [ 3 4 3  
 
The value of the constant λ  (λ  > 0) is presented in the appendix. The no-arbitrage argument that 
establishes common quotes is the same as that for proposition 1. Like P1t and P2t, P3t necessarily 
depends only on public information (because quotes must be common). Here, the additional 
public information is the interdealer order-flow Z t.  
Intuition for λ  > 0 is important because P3t is what motivates dealers’ information-based 
speculation. The market clearing condition is similar to that in round two: 




it it it i t it it it
ii
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Taking the expectation using public information in round three (price being set on the basis of 
this expectation), we get: 
(11)  () 33 3 3
1
[| ] [ () | ] 0
n




Ω+ Ω = ∑  
In this case, however, E[xit|Ω 3t]≠ 0 since interdealer order flow Zt is contained in Ω 3t and provides 
information about the realized xit. A negative Zt, for example, means that average Ti2t is negative – 
dealers are selling in interdealer trading. This implies that, prior to interdealer trading, customers 
                                                      
17 That the Nash equilibrium in price quotes is based on public information only (i.e., dealers optimally put zero weight  13
sold on average; i.e., the negative Zt reflects dealers’ laying off long positions they acquired from 
customers – the xit term in Eq. (11). If customers sold in round one then in round two dealers are 
long. To clear the market in round three, expected P4t-P3t(1+r) must be positive to induce dealers 
to hold this long position. P3t must therefore fall below E[P4t /(1+r)|Ω 3t] to provide the positive 
intraday return needed to compensate dealers.
18 The end result is that the negative Zt drives a 
reduction in price, that is, λ  >0, as we set out to show. As in proposition 1, any price other than 
P3t = E[P4t /(1+r)|Ω 3t]+ λ Zt is incompatible with equilibrium since dDi3t/dP3t < 0. In the fourth 
round, dealers trade with the public to clear their inventory. 
  Notice that the price change between the second and third rounds of trade will be 
positively correlated with inter-dealer order flows Zt. Moreover, the price change between the 
third and fourth rounds will be negatively correlated with inter-dealer order flows Zt, i.e., price 
exhibits high frequency mean reversion.  If the round-one customer flow had been publicly 
observed, then dynamics would be unrelated to the interdealer flows. 
 
Trading Strategies 
  Given the quoting strategy described in propositions 1 and 2, the following optimal 
trading strategy corresponds to symmetric linear equilibrium: 
 
PROPOSITION 4:  The following trading strategy profile ∀ i ∈  {1,...,n} is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, where β 2>1 and β 3<0: 
      it t i x T 2 2 β =  
      it t i x T 3 3 β =  
 
  The values of the β  coefficients are presented in the appendix.
19 Recall that the quoting 
rules for P2t and P3t are linear in E[P3t], and in E[P4t] and Zt, respectively. The trading rules have a 
corresponding linear structure deriving from exponential utility and normality, which generate 
linear speculative demand. The derivations in the appendix insure that the quoting and trading 
                                                                                                                                                              
on their private information in setting quotes) is shown in a similar setting in Lyons (1997). 
18 Recall that the day’s random payoff Rt (equation 2) is realized between the determination of P3t and P4t, so dealers 
are exposed to intraday risk here. At the same time, the expectation of Rt is always zero (i.e., there is no private 
information about fundamentals), which is why we do not include Rt in this discussion of the dealers’ expected return. 
19 The result that β 2 >1 is reminiscent of results from the dual trading literature (see, e.g., Roell 1990 and Fishman and 
Longstaff 1992). The dual trading literature is set in a context of risk-neutral agents so it is not equipped to address 
non-fundamental information. That a setting without any private information about fundamentals can produce trading 
behavior similar to settings that include such information is part of what we set out to show in this paper.  14
strategies are mutually consistent and sequentially rational. These strategies impound dealer 
recognition that their own actions affect price. 
  Here is the intuition behind the result. Recall from propositions 2 and 3 that the return 
P3t￿P2t is wholly a function of public information revealed in that time interval. Recall too that 
within that interval interdealer order flow Zt is the only public information revealed. The positive 
value of the coefficient λ  in proposition 3 ensures that the return P3t￿P2t is positively related to 
the realization of Zt. At the time of trading in round two, individual dealers do not know the 
realization of Zt. But since Zt is simply the sum over all the dealers’ round-two trades Ti2t, each 
dealer does know one component of Zt, namely his own trade (and dealers are fully strategic 
about their own effect on prices). This creates a risk-return tradeoff that would not otherwise 
exist, the risk being uncertainty about other dealers’ trades in Zt (and there is nothing in the model 
that helps a dealer forecast those other components of Zt). To see why β 2 is larger than 1, i.e., why 
the dealer rides herd on his customer order, notice that the positive λ  driving P3t means that price 
will move in the same direction as the dealer’s order Ti2t. After receiving a positive customer 
trade xit, the dealer is short. A non-speculative dealer would buy just enough in the interdealer 
market to cover that short. A speculative dealer buys more than this because the long position will 
profit from the price increase his trade induces. Moreover, β 3 < 0, as dealers adjust their round-
two positions in the third round (per equation 5). This indicates that price (P3t-P2t) will be 
positively correlated with contemporaneous order flows (Ti2t) but negatively correlated with 
lagged order flows (Ti3t). 
 
III.  Speculation Based on Inventory Information 
  The trading strategies in proposition 4 have implications for the role of private non-
fundamental information, and more specifically, for the role of inventory information. For 
example, the coefficient in the rule for round-two trading implies that non-fundamental 
information motivates dealer speculation. 
 
PROPOSITION 5:  Under some regularity conditions, the proposed equilibrium characterized in 
propositions 1-4 exists. In addition, though the model contains no private 
fundamental information, dealers can still speculate based on private non-
fundamental information. 
 
This proposition follows directly from the expression for β 2 in proposition 4. Specifically, the 
appendix shows that β 2 >1 (under some regularity conditions). In the “no speculation” case, β 2= 1  15
since a non-speculative dealer would simply offset his round-one customer trade with an 
interdealer trade, one-for-one. Instead, the dealer chooses to open a risky position, using his 
private information as the basis. 
  The next proposition generalizes our simple example. 
 
PROPOSITION 6: Superior information about other determinants of P3t also qualifies as private 
non-fundamental information, in particular superior information about n, γ , 
2
x σ , or 
2
R σ .  
 
This proposition follows directly from the proof of proposition 2, which shows that P2t is a 
function of all these parameters, none of which provides information about cash flows. Though 
our model focuses on inventory information as one element within the larger non-fundamental 
class, proposition 6 clarifies that many other partitions of the non-fundamental class exist (indeed, 
there are many partitions beyond those specified in the proposition). 
The reason we specify the model without private fundamental information is to establish 
that our results are not based on trades that are cash-flow irrelevant being mistaken for cash-flow 
relevant trades, as occurs in many other models in the literature. Given this specification choice, it 
is helpful to link our result to more familiar contexts, in particular those with private fundamental 
information. The next proposition makes this link by addressing the robustness of private non-
fundamental information as a motive for speculation. 
 
PROPOSITION 7: Introducing private fundamental information does not preclude dealers from 
speculating based on private non-fundamental information. 
 
This proposition also follows directly from the earlier propositions. Specifically, introducing 
private information about Rt does not alter the two risk-premium effects on P3t necessary to clear 
the interdealer market (the first being the transitory component that clears the interdealer market 
and the second being the permanent component that anticipates the P4t that clears the wider 
market). Clearly, introducing private fundamental information will alter the demand function 
described following appendix equation (A7), but one component of that demand function will still 
represent non-fundamental information. 
  Before turning to the empirical model of the next section, let us review some key features 
of our analytical findings. First, when customer order flows (and dealer inventories) are not 
publicly known, interdealer order flow is the means by which information impounded in dealer  16
inventories is subsequently impounded in price. Second, one of the price components that 
inventory information produces is a transitory, intraday effect (corresponding to P4t-P3t). Third, 
the other price component that inventory information produces is permanent, corresponding to 
P4t-P4t-1 (i.e., the daily return). This sharp distinction between transitory and permanent 
components contrasts with analysis of finite-horizon models (e.g., Lyons 1997 and Evans and 
Lyons 2002) where the meaning of permanent is unclear since price ultimately converges to the 
ultimate payoff value in these models. 
 
IV.  Empirical Model and Results  
Our empirical strategy is the following. First, we choose a financial market—foreign 
exchange—for which both theory and empirics line up strongly against the presence of private 
information of the fundamental type (as described in the introduction; for this statement we have 
in mind the major currencies like the $/DM or $/Yen). Second, we provide a flexible empirical 
model for decomposing price into the components highlighted in previous sections. Third, we 
design the empirical model so that price discovery is driven by the same order-flow concept that 
drives our analytical work, namely interdealer order flow Zt. 
We begin by breaking transaction prices into three parts:  
 
(12)  =+ +
PI II
t ttt P PPw ,    
 
The observed price level includes a component of public fundamental information (PI), 
PI
t P , a 
component of inventory information (II), 
II
t P , and a serially uncorrelated sampling error, wt.
20 
(Though Et[Rt+1] is by design not changing in our theoretical model, an empirical model needs to 
accommodate such changes, hence the introduction of 
PI
t P .) The public information component 
follows a random walk: 
 
(13)       ε ∆=
PI
tt P        
 
                                                      
20 This error is present because at any given moment our dataset provides a single price from what is in reality a cross-
sectional distribution of prices (see Evans 2002 for analysis of this cross-sectional property of these data). One cause of 
this distribution is idiosyncratic effects of inventory on individual dealer prices (described in our introduction as the 
first of the three price effects from non-fundamental trades). These transitory, idiosyncratic effects do not arise in our 
theoretical model, nor are they the focus here. Our focus is instead on the price effects from inventory information that 
are common to all dealers (both transitory and permanent effects).  17
The inventory information component 
II
t P  is impounded in price through interdealer trading; this 
is where dispersed information about customer demands xit is aggregated in observable order 
flow. We model the inventory information component as following the (quite flexible) moving-
average process: 
 
(14)         () ∆= Γ
II
tt P Le.       
 
where  et is the innovation in aggregate interdealer flow Zt during period t and Γ (L) is a lag 
polynomial (as yet unspecified). This innovation et can be estimated from realized interdealer 
flow Zt as a moving-average process: 
 
(15)  t t e L Z ) ( Θ = . 
 
where Θ (L) is another lag polynomial (as yet unspecified). Per our model above, the et shocks are 
reflections of (unmeasured) innovations in aggregate LD customer orders xt. Importantly, these 
shocks are independent of the public information shocks ε t and the sampling errors  t w . 
  To disentangle transitory and permanent effects of inventory information, we decompose 
that component of price change 
II
t P  into two parts, one transitory and one permanent. In 
particular, we assume that (14) can be written as:  
 
(16)  () ( 1 ) ∆= Γ + Γ
II
tt t P Le e                  
 
where the lag polynomial  () L Γ  is defined as  () () ( 1 ) LL Γ≡ Γ− Γ . The notation  (1) Γ  is standard 
for denoting the sum of all coefficients in a moving-average polynomial Γ (L). As such,  (1) Γ  
identifies the permanent change in P t
II induced by an et shock (i.e., once et has passed through all 
of the moving-average coefficients, the final net effect is the sum of all those coefficients). Thus, 
the first effect of inventory information  () t L e Γ  is transitory and the second  (1) t e Γ  is permanent. 
In our earlier theoretical model, these two parts correspond to the two price effects engendered by 
the initial impact of λ Z. The transitory part in that model corresponds to an intraday risk premium 
(in the spirit of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam 1995), whereas the permanent part is that which  18
remains even after dealer inventories are shared marketwide (i.e., P4t-P4t-1).
21 Both parts are 
driven by order flow shocks but differ in their long-run impact on the price level.  The focus of 
our empirical analysis will therefore be on estimating Γ () 1  and Γ () L . If inventory information 
plays a role in determining prices, we should expect to find significant coefficients in both Γ () 1 




  To estimate equations (12) – (15) we need to restrict the form of the moving-average 
polynomials Γ () L  and Θ () L . We begin with the following flexible forms (and provide results for 
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where the roots of A z () = 0, and C z () = 0 lie outside the unit circle. Thus, the inventory 
information component in prices, ∆
II
t P , and interdealer order flow Zt are assumed to follow 
covariance stationary processes. Substituting these restrictions into equations (12) – (15) allows 
us to write the model’s reduced form as:  
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21  As noted in the introduction, inventory effects on price are of three types: transitory effects idiosyncratic to 
individual prices, transitory effects common to all dealer prices, and permanent effects common to all dealer prices that 
persist even after dealer inventories are shared economy-wide. This empirical specification is designed to separate the 
permanent effects from the transitory effects. (Our theoretical model did not admit the first type because idiosyncratic 
price effects were ruled out by no-arbitrage.) 
22 One might argue that a finding of significant  () Γ L  is not sufficient to establish the presence of speculative 
opportunities of the kind described by our model. For example, if customer trades are perfectly transparent then 
superior information would not exist, even in a world where the estimated  () Γ L  is positive. But it is an institutional 
fact that FX dealers have private information about their customers’ trades, so this critique of our findings is of little 
practical relevance.  19
The parameters to be estimated include the coefficients of the lag polynomials 
() ,() ,() , AL BL CL  and D L ( ), and the variances of the shocks wt, ε t, and et. Estimates of these 
parameters are obtained by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using the auto-
covariance matrix for  [] ' tt t YP Z =∆ . In particular, let Ω () [ ]
' jE Y Y ttj = −  denote the covariance 
matrix of Yt at lag j. GMM estimates are obtained by matching the theoretical values for Ω () j  
implied by (19) and (20) against sample estimates of Ω () j  for j = 0, 1,￿,12 (see appendix for 
details). 
Our empirical model differs in several respects from those in earlier studies based on 
time-series models for price changes and order flow, most notably Hasbrouck (1991), and more 
recently in the context of FX by Payne (1999). Hasbrouck’s calculations of the share of 
permanent price changes attributable to order flow are derived from estimates of a VAR. This 
approach assumes that the Wold (Vector Moving Average) representation for price changes and 
order flow is invertible. In our model, by contrast, the VMA process is not invertible due to the 
presence of the sampling-error component (i.e., the  t w  shock) in transaction prices. (Evans, 2002 
shows that this component is economically quite significant, a finding confirmed by the 
parameter estimates in Table 1 below.) The second important difference in our approach is that it 
allows us to place theoretical restrictions on the VMA representation for price changes and order 
flow implied by theory.  In particular, our model implies that there are no lagged values of  t ε  in 
the VMA representation. It is not possible to place these restrictions on the VMA representation 
implied by a VAR (without parameter restrictions). Thus, even if our model had an invertible 
VMA representation, the VAR method would yield less efficient estimates of the price change 
and order flow process (under the null of a correctly specified model). Our model also differs 
from Evans (2002) in that we jointly estimate the price change and order flow processes. This 
allows us to conduct inference on the response of price to inventory shocks; and, in particular, 
assess the significance of any permanent price effects. 
 
Data 
We use transactions prices and interdealer order flow from Reuters Dealing 2001 
observed at a five-minute observation interval. (See Evans 2002 for more detail on the Reuters 
source of these data.) P t is the last deutsche mark purchase price for dollars during observation 
interval t. (Using only purchase prices, i.e., only transactions at the ask, eliminates noise from 
bid-ask bounce.) This is the transaction price of buyer-initiated transactions between two dealers.  20
Interdealer order flow, Zt, is the difference between the number of buyer- and seller-initiated 
orders between the midpoints of intervals t and t+1.
23 
Results 
Table 1 reports results for 6 alternative specifications for the lag polynomials 
() ,() ,() , AL BL CL and  D L ( ). Panel A reports the GMM parameter estimates and asymptotic 
standard errors corrected for the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. Models I-III assume 
that order flow follows an ARMA(2,1) process, while models IV – VI assume an ARMA(2,2) 
process.
24 Estimates of the process ∆
II
t P  (price increments from inventory information) are 
reported in the first four rows of the table. The estimate of b0 is approximately 0.30 in every 
model and is highly statistically significant. This implies that shocks to interdealer order flow 
affect prices contemporaneously. The next four rows report estimates of the interdealer order flow 
process Zt. These estimates imply that Zt is a persistent but stationary process. 
  Panel B reports implications for permanent and transitory price effects from inventory 
information. The first row captures the permanent impact. It reports the implied estimate of 
Γ () 1.
25 The estimates range from 0.00108 to 0.00189 and are all highly statistically significant. 
Given an average trade size of $3.9 million, these estimates imply that a $1 billion positive shock 
to interdealer order flow permanently increases the deutsche mark price of the dollar by 0.25 to 
0.45 of a pfennig.  The next rows report the estimates of Γ(0) , which correspond to the total 
initial impact of order flow shocks (i.e., the permanent and transitory combined). These estimates 
range from 0.00270 to 0.00306 and are all significantly different from zero. They imply that a $1 
billion positive shock to interdealer order flow contemporaneously increases the deutsche mark 
price of a dollar by 0.69 to 0.78 pfennig. 
  For further perspective on the economic significance of shocks to inventory information, 
we compare the response of price to this information relative to the price response to public 
information.  Specifically, we use the model estimates to compute IR(k): the response of the price 
level at t+k to a one standard deviation shock in inventory information et, relative to the effects of 
a one standard deviation shock in public information ε t.  As the table shows, the immediate 
                                                      
23 Our dataset does not include information on trade size, only trade sign. Even in instances where past researchers have 
had data on both sign and size, however, they have chosen to measure order flow as the net number of trades (e.g., 
Hasbrouck 1991).   
24 As shown in equation (17), we allowed for the lag polynomial B(L) to be second order, but there is no evidence that 
b2≠ 0, so our results are based on B(L) being first order.  
25 See Appendix B for details on our econometric identification of the permanent and transitory components of the lag 
polynomial Γ (L). Specifically, we examine specifications flexible enough to allow short lags (up to 15 minutes) before 
the permanent effects of order flow are fully reflected in prices.  21
impact of a typical inventory shock is approximately 45 percent the size of a typical public news 
shock. Over the next 30 minutes, the transitory contribution of the inventory shock subsides. 
Thereafter, prices reflect the permanent effect of the inventory shock, which range between 15 
and 30 percent (according to the model specification). These estimates of permanent effects 
indicate that inventory shocks play an economically significant role in the determination of spot 
rates at macroeconomic frequencies.  
Note that the long-run price effects are precisely estimated and highly statistically 
significant.
26 We attribute this level of precision to the four-month span of our data. Though this 
time span is short relative to many macroeconomic half-lives (i.e., the half-lives of stationary 
macro time-series), it is orders of magnitude longer than the half-lives of variables associated 
with trading.
27 For example, Lyons (1995) estimates the half-life of an FX dealer’s positions to be 
approximately 10 minutes. On par with this, our estimates of the impulse response functions show 
that the half-life of transitory effects from inventory shocks is about 15 minutes. Compared 
against this trading time scale, four months of trading data constitute a rather long sample, 
providing further assurance that our inferences concerning persistent effects are reliable.  
  We examine the temporal impact of inventory shocks more closely in the remaining rows 
of the table. Here we report the share of the total price effect from inventory information that 
















       
 
                                                      
26  The precision of the estimates differentiates our results on permanent effects from others in the literature. In 
particular, Payne (1999) computes the contribution of order flow shocks to exchange rates from a VAR using one week 
of data. Though his were the only data on brokered interdealer trading available at that time, they offer less information 
on permanent price effects than our four-month sample. In one section of his paper, Evans (2002) reports variance 
decompositions indicating that shocks to order flow affect prices at various frequencies, but does not address the 
statistical significance of permanent effects. (Froot and Ramadorai 2002 address permanent effects from portfolio 
flows, but their data do not include measures of order flow, i.e., there is no way to distinguish buyer- from seller-
initiated trades, which is essential for disentangling demand curves shifts—news—from price-induced movement along 
demand curves.)  
27 To elaborate, consider the half-life of departures from the macro relation called purchasing power parity (PPP). The 
consensus estimate of that half-life is 4 years (Froot and Rogoff 1995). With such a long half-life, how large a sample 
would be needed to estimate PPP with as many half-lives in the sample as we have in our sample? The estimated half-
life of transitory inventory effects in our sample is 15 minutes. Our four-month sample implies about 3500 of these 
half-lives (based on trading between 7:00 am and 5:00 pm). The comparable time span for macro PPP data would be 
approximately 14,000 years (3500 x 4 years). It is hard to believe that there would be much debate about the long-run 
properties of macro time series over so long a time span. In any case, while we cannot claim that inventory shocks 
literally affect the exchange rate forever (since that would require infinite data series), we feel justified in asserting that 
our model provides precise estimates of the persistent effects.  
  22
where ∆
k denotes the k-difference operator and 
Trans
t P  is the transitory component  () Γ t L e  (from 
equation 16). The table reports ratios ranging from k = 6 to 24 (5 minutes to 2 hours), together 
with asymptotic standard errors.  
  If transitory effects from inventory information are not an economically important factor 
driving prices in the short run, the estimates of R(k) should be insignificantly different from zero 
for all horizons k. The table shows that this is not the case (for any of the models): the transitory 
effect of inventory information appears to contribute between 43 and 89 percent of the standard 
deviation in inventory information price changes over horizons from 30 minutes to two hours.  23
 
Table 1:  Model Estimates 
 
  Model Variations 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) 
Panel A              
a1  -0.646 (0.048)  -0.529 (0.073)  -0.341 (0.346)  -0.623 (0.048) -0.457 (0.076)  -0.374 (0.319)
a2        0.123 (0.251)       0.063 (0.225)
b0(x100)  0.291 (0.035) 0.274 (0.036) 0.270 (0.036) 0.306 (0.034) 0.290 (0.036) 0.288 (0.036)
b1 (x100)     -0.100  (0.037)  -0.153 (0.088)     -0.124  (0.037)  -0.147 (0.088)
              
c1    1.039 (0.081) 1.049 (0.089) 1.057 (0.094) 0.423 (0.153) 0.424 (0.151) 0.428 (0.155)
c2  -0.129 (0.035)  -0.125 (0.036)  -0.128 (0.036) 0.363 (0.107) 0.382 (0.104) 0.379 (0.106)
d1  -0.850 (0.073)  -0.876 (0.081)  -0.885 (0.087)  -0.211 (0.151) -0.226 (0.149)  -0.231 (0.152)
d2         -0.442  (0.088) -0.473  (0.089)  -0.470 (0.090)
              
σ e  4.233 (0.080) 4.217 (0.080) 4.212 (0.080) 4.231 (0.081) 4.215 (0.080) 4.215 (0.081)
σ ε   0.038 (0.002) 0.037 (0.002) 0.037 (0.002) 0.038 (0.002) 0.039 (0.002) 0.038 (0.002)
σ ω   0.034 (0.002) 0.033 (0.002) 0.034 (0.002) 0.034 (0.002) 0.033 (0.002) 0.033 (0.002)
Panel B 
            
Γ () 1  (x100)   0.177 (0.025) 0.114 (0.032) 0.096 (0.042) 0.189 (0.025) 0.114 (0.032) 0.108 (0.040)
Γ(0)   (x100)  0.291 (0.035) 0.274 (0.036) 0.270 (0.036) 0.306 (0.034) 0.290 (0.036) 0.288 (0.036)
                
 IR(0): impact     0.463 (0.052) 0.436 (0.051) 0.430 (0.052) 0.482 (0.051) 0.440 (0.049) 0.448 (0.050)
 IR(3):  15  min.   0.357 (0.036) 0.253 (0.051) 0.225 (0.057) 0.369 (0.036) 0.229 (0.050) 0.228 (0.056)
 IR(6):  30  min.   0.261 (0.042) 0.170 (0.049) 0.141 (0.068) 0.279 (0.042) 0.168 (0.047) 0.160 (0.064)
 IR(∞ ):  perm.  0.281 (0.037) 0.181 (0.049) 0.153 (0.065) 0.297 (0.038) 0.173 (0.047) 0.167 (0.060)
              
 R(6): 30 min.  0.796 (0.013) 0.864 (0.038) 0.892 (0.064) 0.790 (0.012) 0.866 (0.038) 0.878 (0.058)
 R(12): 1 hr.   0.591 (0.013) 0.689 (0.059) 0.736 (0.111) 0.585 (0.012) 0.698 (0.060) 0.715 (0.093)
 R(24): 2 hrs.   0.430 (0.011) 0.525 (0.061) 0.576 (0.125) 0.425 (0.010) 0.535 (0.064) 0.554 (0.101)
Notes: The table reports GMM estimates of the model: 
                                    ∆Γ PL e w w tt t t t =+ + − − () ε 1,  ZL e
tt =Θ ()     
where Γ () ( )( ) Lb b L a L a L =+ −− 01 1 2
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2
12
2 . Pt  is the last DM purchase 
price for dollars during observation interval t. Interdealer order flow, Zt, is defined by the difference between the 
number of buyer-initiated orders and seller-initiated orders between the midpoints of intervals t and t+1. In Panel B, 
Γ (1) measures the permanent price effect of shocks to inventory information, whereas Γ (0) measures the initial price 
impact of shocks to inventory information. IR(k) is the  impulse response of the price level at t+k to a one standard 
deviation shock to inventory information et relative to the effects of a one standard deviation shock to public 
information 
t ε .  R(k) is the contribution at horizon k of transitory price changes from inventory information to the 
standard deviation of total price changes from inventory information (measured in 5 minute intervals).   
( ) ( )
1
() v a r ( ) v a r ( )
−
=∆ ∆
k Trans k II
tt Rk P P ,     
Estimation details are described in Appendix B. Asymptotic standard errors, corrected for conditional hetero-
skedasticity, are reported in parentheses.   24
 
V.  Conclusion 
We posed a specific question at the outset: In a market with symmetric information about 
fundamentals, can information-based trade still arise? This paper shows the answer is yes and 
provides some conceptual room for why. That there is any need for this conceptual room is due at 
least in part to models of trading that historically define private information rather narrowly. The 
inventory information we introduce here is unrelated to fundamentals, yet still provides a motive 
for speculation because it correlates with future price. As is well known, many factors affect 
future price not by affecting expected cash flows, but by affecting discount rates. Examples 
include features of the economy like traders’ endowments, risk aversions, trading constraints, and 
many others. What we have done here is add superior knowledge of these factors. Note that our 
model does not rely on non-fundamental trades masquerading as fundamental information; to 
make this distinction clear we specified the model without any private fundamental information. 
In effect, the paper occupies a space between literatures in asset pricing and microstructure, the 
former treating permanent endowment effects on price but without information asymmetries (e.g., 
Duffie and Constantinides 1996 and Storesletten et al. 2003), whereas the latter treats information 
asymmetries but only those relating to cash flows. 
The idea of inventory information is not special, but relies instead on two rather generally 
present ingredients: less than perfect transparency and risk aversion. Less than perfect 
transparency insures that inventory information is not instantly symmetrized. Risk aversion 
insures that inventory information is relevant to prices. The combination allows for trading based 
on superior information even when fundamental information is symmetric.
28  
Our analysis clarifies that the effects of non-fundamental trades on prices are of three 
distinct types. The first is transitory and idiosyncratic to individual dealer prices—the so-called 
inventory effects from microstructure theory. The second type is transitory and common to all 
dealer prices (intraday risk premia). The third type is permanent and common to all dealer prices. 
This third effect on price persists even after dealer inventories are fully shared economy-wide 
(i.e., the portfolio effects that arise from imperfect substitutability across risky assets; see, e.g.,  
Branson and Henderson 1985). These traditional models do not address the third type of  effect 
because inventory risk in these models is assumed diversifiable at the economy-wide level (or 
because these models do not allow market-wide risk sharing to occur—dealers are forced to hold 
                                                      
28 As noted, for readers concerned about the single-price assumption used for interdealer trade, our basic results go 
through in a variation of the model in which each dealer quotes a price schedule to one other dealer that is not 
observable market-wide.   25
the risky asset at the time of cash flow realization). Our empirical methodology is designed to 
accommodate this third, permanent effect. 
We find that inventory information has both transitory and permanent price effects. For 
permanent effects, our estimates imply that a $1 billion positive shock to interdealer order flow 
increases the DM price of a dollar in the long run by 0.25 to 0.45 of a pfennig (depending on 
model variations). These permanent effects also contribute significantly to the variance of 
permanent price changes, ranging from 15 to 30 percent. Transitory price effects from inventory 
information are also significant: of the total variance of price changes from inventory 
information, transitory effects account for between 43 and 89 percent at horizons from 30 minutes 
to two hours. In the end, these results suggest that past empirical findings that trades do indeed 
convey private information (whether in FX or other security markets) may have been picking up 
information that is non-fundamental, at least in part, despite the traditional interpretation as 
wholly fundamental.    26
Figure 1 
 






















Pi1t:  dealer i’s quote in round one of day t.  
xit:  net customer order received by dealer i. 
Pi2t:  dealer i’s quote in round two. 
Ti2t:  dealer i’s net outgoing order to other dealers in round two. 
Zt:  net interdealer order flow in round two. 
Pi3t:  dealer i’s quote in round three 
Ti3t:  dealer i’s net outgoing order to other dealers in round three. 
Rt:  risky asset cash flow realized. 
Pi4t:  dealer i’s quote in round four. 
dt:  aggregate customer orders in round four (market clearing requires  it
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Appendix A: Model Solution 
 
  This appendix repeatedly uses certain information sets and conditional expectations. To 
simplify notation, we present these at the outset for reference.  
 
Information Sets:  Ω i1t ≡  { } { 1 1 t i
n
i P = } 
   Ω i2t ≡  {xit,  } , { 2 1 1 t i t i
n
i P P = } 
Ω i3t ≡  {xit,  } , , { 3 2 1 1 t i t i t i
n
i P P P = ,Ti2t,T
′
i2t,Zt} 
Ω i4t ≡  {xit,  } , , , { 4 3 2 1 1 t i t i t i t i
n




i3t,Rt}   
Ω 1t ≡  { } { 1 1 t i
n
i P = } 
   Ω 2t ≡  { } , { 2 1 1 t i t i
n
i P P = } 
   Ω 3t ≡  { } , , { 3 2 1 1 t i t i t i
n
i P P P = ,Zt} 
   Ω 4t ≡  { } , , , { 4 3 2 1 1 t i t i t i t i
n
i P P P P = ,Zt,Rt} 
 
The first four are the information sets available to individual dealers i at the time trades are 
determined in each of the four rounds. The second four are the public information sets available 
at the time trades are determined in each round. 
 
A.1.  Proof of Proposition 1: Public Investors 
 
Proposition 1 asserts that the end-of-day price is P4t= ￿aht. To show this, recall that the 
liquidity-supplying (LS) investors have the following utility defined over intertemporal 
consumption ct (per equation 1): 
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We begin by conjecturing a value function, which we show below is consistent with optimizing 
behavior on the part of LS investors: 
 
()
2 ˆ exp αγ ψ =− − − tt t VW h  
 
where Wt is the LS investors’ nominal wealth at the end of day t and  ht is the total holding of the 
risky asset at the end of day t (defined in equation 9). We need to determine the conditions under 
which ht is willingly held by the LS investors. 
Given the proposed price function P4t= ￿aht in text proposition 1, our task is to begin 
with the Bellman equation corresponding to the maximum of equation (1) and derive explicit  33
expressions for the three coefficient values γ ˆ, ψ, and α, in this conjectured value function, as 
well as an expression for the parameter a in the price function. We shall show that we must have: 
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and where we have used Dt to denote the LS investors’ demand for the risky asset. The first order 
condition with respect to ct is: 
() ()
2
11 ˆˆ exp (1 ) exp γγ δ γ αγ ψ ++  −= + − −  tt t t cr E W h  
 
Notice that the consumption decision is unaffected by the investment decision Dt, due to CARA 
utility. To get an explicit expression for the right-hand side, we calculate the following 
expectation with respect to the two random variables Rt+1, and xt+1, both of which are normally 
distributed with mean zero and respective variances 
2 σ R and 
2 σ x :  
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This is equivalent to the expression for the pricing parameter “a” presented above. To get the 
coefficient ψ  on 
2
t h  in the value function, we collect terms in equation (A1) involving 
2
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Substituting the expected value function in the next period back into the Bellman equation, we get 
the expression for α: 
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It is easy to show that when the coefficient of risk aversion γ  is sufficiently small, there exists a 
positive solution for the parameters. Finally, that a value function with this simple exponential 
form exists ensures that the linear equilibrium pricing rule described in proposition 1 also exists 





A.2.  Proof of Propositions 2 and 3: Price Determination in the First Three Rounds 
 
  First consider why in any given trading round all dealers i ∈  {1,...,n}  choose to offer the 
same price. As shown in a similar setting in Lyons (1997), this is necessary to avoid unbounded 
arbitrage demands given that quotes are singleton prices and available to all participants (see 
quoting rules R1-R3 and trading rules R4-R6). For risk-averse dealers, an equilibrium that 
includes such arbitrage trading cannot be optimal. A common price, then, must depend only on 
commonly observed information, i.e., public information.  
  The equilibrium level of the round-one price is Pi1t=P1t=E[P2t|Ω 1t], i.e., quotes to 
customers in the first round are an unbiased estimate of the round-two price (conditional on 
public information available at the time of quoting Ω 1t). Two main features of the model produce 
this result: dealers cannot forecast customers’ trades and dealers are risk averse. To prove this 
formally, based on the value function from the previous appendix section (with positive constants 
A1 and A2) one can demonstrate that: 
 
(A1)                  E[Ui (Pi1t)]      =  E[E[Ui|Ω i1t]] = E[-A1 exp(- ˆ γ (Pi1t ￿ P2t ) xit - A2xit
2)] 
                                                 =  E[E[-A1 exp(- ˆ γ (Pi1t ￿ P2t ) xit - A2xit
2)| xit
2]] 
                                                 ≤  E[Ui (E[P2t|Ω 1t])]  
                                                 =  E[-A1 exp(-A2xit
2)] 
          =  E[-A1 exp(- ˆ γ (P2t ￿ P2t )E[xit |xit




Here, the inequality in the third line arises because absorbing a random position of -xit at a price 
Pi1t that is conditionally biased relative to the unwinding price P2t can only add to risk (with no 
effect on expected return). The inequality is strict for any price Pi1t≠E[P2t|Ω 1t], so it is optimal for 
the dealer not to deviate from the proposed equilibrium strategy. 
The equilibrium level of the round-two price is Pi2t=P2t=E[P3t|Ω 2t], i.e., quotes to other 
dealers in the second round are an unbiased estimate of the round-three price. To see this, note 
that at the beginning of the second round of trading—the first purely interdealer round—the 
expected current holding of dealers conditional on public information is still zero (since there is 
no new public information useful for estimating dealer positions). Since the round-two market 
must clear among dealers alone, the only price not expected to generate excess dealer demand is 
the expected future price. Specifically, the price P2t in proposition 2 is pinned down by the 
relation: 
  36
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where Ω 2t is public information available for quoting. (Since P2t is common across dealers i it is 
necessarily conditioned on public information only.) At the time of quoting in round two there is 
nothing in Ω 2t that helps estimate xit so E[xit|Ω 2t]=0. The only value of P2t for which E[Di2t 
(P2t)|Ω 2t]=0 is P2t=E[P3t |Ω 2t] since Di2t(E[P3t |Ω 2t] )=0 and D′ i2t < 0.  
As proposition 3 asserts, in the third round a bias in P3t is necessary for the analogue of 
Eq. (A2) to hold:  
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First consider the term E[xit|Ω 3t]. Given P1t, P2t   and P3t  are common across dealers and 
conditioned only public information, the only variable in Ω 3t relevant for determining P3t is Zt, 
interdealer order flow from round two. We have: 
 E[xit|Ω 3t] = E[xit|Zt] = E[xit|
i Σ β 2xit] = (nβ 2)
-1Zt 
To determine E[Di3t (P3t)|Ω 3t] in Eq. (A3), we use normality and exponential utility to write: 
E[Di3t|Ω 3t] = E[P4t+Rt-(1+r)P3t|Ω 3t]/(
2 ˆ R γ σ )= -(1+r)λΖ t/(
2 ˆ R γ σ ). 
These expressions in Eq. (A3) imply:  
  λ  = 
2 ˆ R γ σ /[(1+r)nβ 2]  
with λ  >0 unambiguously. 
 
A.3.  Proof of Proposition 4: Optimal Dealer Trading Strategies 
 
The derivation of dealer trading strategies has 3 steps. First we determine the round-three 
trading strategy given actions in earlier rounds. (We do not start with round-four trading because 
dealers’ round-four trading is passive: they simply take the other side of LS-customer trades, 
ending the day with a net position of zero.) Next we determine the expected utilities of possible 
trading strategies in round 2. Finally, we solve this maximization problem.  
 
A.3.1.  Step One: Maximization in the Third Round 
 
  To solve the dynamic programming problem we first determine the dealer’s round-three  37
desired position for use in the round-two first order condition. Under normality and negative 
exponential utility the round-three desired position takes the well-known form: 
 
  Di3t = E[P4t +Rt–(1+r)P3t]/(
2 ˆ R γ σ )= E[P4t –(1+r)P3t]/(
2 ˆ R γ σ ) 
 
where  ˆ γ   is the intertemporal coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 
2
R σ  denotes Var[Rt].  
 
Notice that from proposition 3 that we have: 







































Thus, we have:  
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and 
(A4)  Di3t =[a(x it - Ti2t /β 2)-(1+r)λΖ t ]/(
2 ˆ R γ σ ) 
 
Omitting terms unrelated to Di2t, we can write the dealers’ problem as: 
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2
2
22 3 2 4 3 4 3 2 ˆ e x p ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
it
it it t t t t R t t t it
D
Er D T P P P r P P R r P Max γσ




A.3.2.  Step Two: Expected Dealer Utility after Second Round Trading 
 
We can use the moment generating function for the normally distributed variable Rt to re-express 
the last term in the exponential function so that the full problem is now:  
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which leaves the objective function focused on the random variable P3t. 
Now, notice that interdealer order flow Zt can be written as the sum of two components, 
dealer i’s interdealer order plus the sum of all the other dealers’ interdealer orders: 
 


















and the product  2 (1 ) it nT ′ −  arises because dealer i receives a share 1/(n-1) of all other dealers’ 
outgoing trades (by trading rule R6). Moreover, we have:  38
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After substituting the expressions for P2t, P3t, and P4t into (A6) and taking expectations with 
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A.3.3.  Step Three: Maximization in the Second Round 
Notice that  it t i it t i x D x T + = = 2 2 2 β .  After ignoring irrelevant terms, with some algebra the 
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The maximization problem reduces to a quadratic maximization problem. Assuming that A is 
negative (which we return to below), we take the first order condition for the maximization 














Noting that:    39















substituting these expressions for λ  and Di2t in (A7) gives the following quadratic equation: 
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When the number of dealers n goes to infinity and the pricing coefficient a goes to zero, the 













There exists a solution β 2 in the interval (1, ∞ ) when n is infinity and a is zero. Since the 
coefficients of β 2  in (Α8)  is continuous in n and a, there exists a unique solution for β 2 in the 
interval (1, ∞ ), for large n. Further, it is easy to check that the assumption that A is negative is 
satisfied for large n. Q.E.D. Appendix B
The model to be estimated takes the form
Pt = PPI
t + PII
t + wt (B1)
∆PPI
t = εt (B2)
∆PII
t = Γ(L)et (B3)
Zt = Θ(L)et (B4)
where Γ(L) and Θ(L) are polynomials in the lag operator, and wt,ε t and et are mean zero shocks. Pt is the
last DM purchase price for dollars during observation interval t, and Zt is inter dealer order ￿ow over the
same interval.
In our theoretical model LD customer orders are re￿ected in interdealer order ￿ow before they aﬀect
prices. This means that all the price-implications of aggregate LD customer ￿ows can be identi￿ed by the
eﬀects of inter dealer order ￿ow on prices (see Proposition 3). In actual markets the transmission of customer
￿ow information may be a little more subtle. In particular, some dealers (i.e. those working for large money
center banks) have access to a large customer base that may enable them to make inferences about aggregate
LD customer orders before the information becomes embedded in inter dealer order ￿ow. These dealers may
then take advantage of the market￿s imperfect transparency to revise their prices in anticipation of inter
dealer order ￿ow. (For a further discussion of transparency in the interdealer market, see Evans 2002).
To allow for this more complex information transmission pattern, we model the shocks to measured inter
dealer order ￿ow over interval t, Zm
t , as follows. Let the shock to order ￿ow during interval t be comprised of
two components; et = e1t+e2t. We assume that e1t shocks contain information on LD customer ￿ows that is
embedded in prices one period before being manifest in inter dealer order ￿ow. This assumption limits the
information advantage of dealers with large customer bases to less than half of the typical inventory half-life
of 10 minutes (Lyons, 1995). Information on LD ￿ow that becomes embedded in prices via inter dealer order
￿ow is represented by e2,t.W ec a nn o we x p r e s st h ed y n a m i c so fm e a s u r e do r d e r￿ow and II price changes
by
∆PII
t = Γ(L)(e2t + e1t+1), (B5)
Zm
t+1 = Θ(L)(e1t+1 + e2t+1). (B6)











model in (B1), (B2), (B5) and (B6) can be written in state-space form as
ζt = Aζt + Bηt (B7)
ξt = Cζt
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for j =0 ,1,...12, against their counterparts implied by the state space form in (B7):
CΨ(j)C0 where Ψ(j)=AΨ(j − 1) with Ψ(0) = vec−1 £
(I − A ⊗ A)−1vec(BΩB0)
⁄
. Further details of this
procedure are described in Evans (2002). To conserve space, Table 1 reports estimates of speci￿cations in
which b2 =0 . Estimates of the model without this restriction were very similar to those reported, and the
estimates of b2 were statistically insigni￿cant.
To compute the contribution of inventory information to the variance of II price changes, we ￿rst need




=( Γ(L) − Γ(1))e∗
t + Γ(1)(1 − Lτ)e∗
t + Γ(1)e∗
t−τ







t = e1t+1 + e2,t.We identify the transitory component of the ∆PII
t process as ∆PTrans
t = ﬂ Γ(L)e∗
t.
This decomposition is slightly more general than the one given in the text because it allows there to be a
lag of τ periods before the permanent eﬀects of the shock e∗
t are re￿ected in prices. Table 1 reports results
for the τ =3case (i.e., a lag of 15 minutes), but the results we obtain for the cases where τ =0 ,1, and 2
are very similar. In particular, the estimates of ﬂ Γ(0) are statistically signi￿cant in every case.
To compute the variance contributions, we use the GMM estimates to write the ∆PII
t and ∆PTrans
t
processes as a new state space system.



































t = h1Yt and ∆PTrans
t = h2Yt. For the τ =3case,














      

a1 a2 b1 b2 00



















      

and C =
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1 0000 0
1 0000−Γ(1)
‚
.
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